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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F· THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH BUNKER HARDMAN, Ad- \ 
ministratrix of the Estate of 
Oswald C. Hardman, deceased. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
GAINES EDWARD THURMAN and 
WOODROW W. DICKEY, doing 
business as Dickey Woody Produce 
Company, 
Defendants and .Appellants. 
\ 
Brief of Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by plaintiff as administra-
trix of the estate of Oswald C. Hardman in behalf of 
the widow, a minor daughter and three minor sons of 
the deceased. It arose out of an automobile accident at 
the intersection of Twenty-first South and State Streets, 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 29th day of October, 
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1949. The Hardman automobile was driven by the widow 
of the deceased. Mr. and Mrs. Hardman had been work-
ing on some apartments being constructed in their home. 
She suggested that they take a short ride in an attempt 
to get the baby to sleep. (R. 208) The deceased was 
riding in the front seat on the right-hand side of the 
automobile. They had stopped at the Royal Dairy on 
South State Street, and at Mrs. Hardman's suggestion 
left there to go to Al Harris' Milk Depot, just ·east of 
State Street on Twenty-first South to get an ice cream 
cone. ( R. 208-9) 
As they approached the Twenty-first ·South inter-
section, Mrs. Hardman was driving in the first lane west 
of the center line. She made a signal for a left-hand turn 
at about the time she \vas opposite the hospital. The 
light was green as she approached the intersection. (R. 
210) It was on Saturday night at approximately 9:15 
and traffic was heavy. (ibid) One or two cars in front 
of the Hardman car in the same lane made left-hand 
turns, but the Hardman car stopped to permit several 
cars to proceed north on State Street. It was stopped 
south of the pedestrian lane in this position when a 
tanker approached from the south and stopped in the 
first lane east of the center line, waiting to make a 
left-hand turn to go west. (R. 129 and 135) A tan auto-
mobile stopped in .the second lane east of the center lane, 
apparently to permit the Hardma_n car to make its turn. 
··When these two automobiles stopped and the way 
appeared clear, Mrs. Hardman proceeded easterly on to 
Twenty-first· South in low gear. She: had crossed ap-
·2 
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proximately two and one-half lanes 'vhen the Hardman 
automobile 'vas struck by the truck driven by defendant 
Thurman and o"·ned by defendant Dickey. There 'vas 
evidence that the truck was moving in excess of 42 miles 
per hour at the time its skid marks first appeared on the 
pavement. (See R. 96; and see the skid marks drawn on 
Exhibit A.) The truck driYer testified that he "·as driving 
in the eastermost lane, but there was some evidence that 
he had swung from the first or second lane into the third 
lane to pass the tanker and tan automobile which had 
stopped. The truck driver testified that he could not see 
an object directly in front of the tanker. (R. 260) Mrs. 
Hardman testified that she never did see the truck. (R. 
213) 
Since the detailed evidence concerning the speed 
and distances traveled by the automobiles is discussed 
in the argument, it is not duplicated here. It is stipu-
lated that Mr. Hardman died from the injuries received 
in the accident, and this action was brought as a result. 
The jury returned a verdict of $21,464.88. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE QUESTION OF SPEED AS AN ELE~IENT OF 
NEGLIGENCE WAS PROPERLY LEFT TO 
THE JURY. 
(a) The speed of defendants' truck was not the 
only element of negligence. 
(b) Proper foundation was laid for the testimony 
of Dr. Swigart. 
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POINT II. 
THE QUESTIONS OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLI-
GENCE, C01~TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND 
PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE PROPERLY SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS RULINGS. 
(a) The testimony of Witness Brady was properly 
admitted. 
(b) The expert opinion of Dr. Swigart was prop- . 
erly admitted. 
(c) The testimony of Witness Peterson as to the 
· qualifications of deceased was properly admitted. 
(d) The Court did not err in denying defendants' 
motion for a directed verdict and defendants' motion 
for dismissal. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT COMPLAIN OF THE IN-
STRUCTIONS OF THE COURT SINCE THEY 
WERE MORE GENEROUS TO THEM THAN THE 
LAW REQUIRES. 
(a) The Court instructed that the negligence of 
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(b) Requested Instruction No. 12 \vas adequately 
covered by Instruction No. 15. 




THE QUESTION OF SPEED AS AN ELEMENT OF 
NEGLIGENCE WAS PROPERLY LEFT TO 
THE JURY. 
·(a) The speed of defendants' truck was not the only 
element of negligence. 
In their brief (P. 5) defendants contend that the 
only possible negligence on the part of Thurman was 
the driving of the tru.ck at an excessive speed immedi-
ately prior to the impact. This is an incorrect statement 
of the evidence and of plaintiff's theory and of the 
theory of the trial judge. There was evidence to support 
the following. claims of negligence: Failure to keep a 
proper lookout for automobiles in and upon the highway, 
and particularly the automobile driven by Mrs. Hard-
man; failure to have the truck under control, and particu-
larly failure to have the truck under control so that it 
could be stopped, and particularly to avoid the striking 
of the automobile driven by Mrs. Hardman; failure of 
the driver of the truck to avoid striking the Hardman 
automobile after its presence became known; proceeding 
through the intersection on Twenty-first South and State 
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Streets in the most easterly lane of traffic when such 
lane of traffic terminates at Twenty-first South, i.e., the 
attempt of the defendant Thurman to pass three abreast 
through the intersection at Twenty-first South, particu-
larly. in view of the fact that the truck driver knew there 
were only two lanes north of the intersection and it 
would be necessary for him to cut in in a westerly direc-
tion in passing through said intersection; passing 
through the intersection when two other cars in the 
lanes to the west of the defendant had stopped to yield 
the right-of-way to the Hardman car; failure to yield 
the right-of-way to the Hardman car. 
The attention of the Court is invited to the fact that 
the truck driver testified that he was traveling only 20 
miles an hour as he entered the intersection. (R. 236) 
This testimony is in the face of the physical evidence 
to the effect that there were skid marks 127 feet long, 
indicating that the truck had skidded 76 feet. (The 
truck is 51 feet long.) Section 57-5-205, Paragraph (b), 
of the Utah Code requires that a vehicle must be in 
proper co~dition to be stopped in 30 feet at 20 miles per 
hour, so that if the jury believed defendant Thurman's 
testimony as to the speed, it certainly could have found 
him to be negligent in not stopping in time to avoid the 
accident. Especially is this true in view of the undenied 
evidence that the brakes and other stopping mechanism 
of the truck were in proper working condition. 
The point made is that speed was not the only ele-
ment of negligence here. The evidence concerning speed 
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must, of course, be considered with the other citcum-
stances. These matters 'vere coYered adequately by In-
struction No. ~ (R. 55); Instruction No. 4 (R. 58); In-
struction No. 5 (R. 59), and Instruction No. 6 (R. 60). 
(b) Proper foundation was laid for the testimony 
of Dr. Swigart. 
Perhaps the major contention of defendants' brief 
is that there 'v-as insufficient data upon which to base 
any expert opinion as to the speed of the truck. Defend-
ants contend that there was no evidence of skidding by 
the truck. Defendants do not contend that Dr. Swigart 
is not a qualified ''""itness to compute the speed of the 
truck if sufficient data was furnished; nor do they com-
plain of the exactness of the computations if the data 
was correct. 
The jury was, of course, not obliged to agree with 
the witnesses concerning the data or its exactness. The 
questions to Dr. Swigart assumed the facts to be as indi-
cated in the questions. The jury was advised fully that 
it \vas to determine whether the data was correct. 
It is submitted that there is ample evidence that the 
truck skidded. 
Officer Brady of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's of-
fice and Officer Clark of the Salt Lake City Police De-
partment, Traffic Division, testified as to the measure-
ments of the skid marks made by the truck. Officer 
Brady testified as follows: 
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'' Q. Will you tell us whether there were any 
skid marks at the impact, leading from either one 
of the automobiles, either car or truck~ 
A. Yes, there were several skid marks, Offi-
cer Clark and I measured. 
Q. Did you measure the skid marks from the 
truck~ 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. Will you describe the skid marks from the 
truck~ 
* * * • 
A. The skid marks from the trailer were the 
heaviest marks and up to the point of impact, 
and from the impact on in we measured more 
skid marks. 
The first marks measured from evidently 
where the air set them. We measured from there 
to where the car came to rest. There were sev-
eral skid marks there, cars going sidewards and 
which I learned from the truck was the left 
front-" 
* * * * 
''A. We measured the skid mark where the 
air was applied and also the skid mark from the 
point of impact to where the car rested-that is 
the left front tire. 
Q. And did you hold the end~ 
A. I read it off. Officer· Clark held the sta-
tionery end and I held the end with the measure-
ments.'' 
* * * * 
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A. Yes, it ""as the left front tire of the truck,, 
the one that left the skid ma.rk; we measured from 
the point of impact to where the car came to rest. 
Q. South of the point of impact what did the 
mark look like~ 
A. The south point of the impact was heavy, 
the trailer marks left were the heaviest, marks 
made by the trailer. 
Q. Have you ever driven an object similar to 
tha.t truck~ 
A. Not quite that large. I have driven a semi-
trailer with tractor and trailer, not that large. 
Q. Are you familiar with the braking manipu-
lation for stopping a unit of that kind~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And can you tell us whether you looked at 
the tires of this outfit to determine whether there 
had been any skidding~ 
A. Yes, I did. I checked the duals on the 
trailer on the left side, on the right side, the load 
evidently was leaking, the refrigeration was leak-
ing and I didn't check that. 
Officer Clark - we had to go under the trailer 
to get the marks. As he went under it, I went 
around it. I would see where the tire had been 
drug. 
Q. (by Mr. Hanson) Which tire, Officer~ 
A. That is the tractor tires on the left rear." 
(R. 112-113.) 
And on Page 115 : 
"Q. (by Mr. Burton) Now, will you describe 
the mark that appeared on the pavement south 
·9 
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of the point of impact,- do you· understand, Mr. 
Brady' 
A. Yes, those were heavy marks. 
Q. Just describe them. 
A. They were wide marks like I have said, 
like the trailer had been locked and drug.'' 
'' Q. You inspected the rear trailer wheels~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You saw where they skidded~ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did you check the tractor wheels of the 
truck~ 
A. No. 
Q. They may or may not have been skidding? 
A. It was a routine check. I just happened to 
find them by accident and make a mark they had 
been slid ; I didn't make a specified check of all 
tires to see whether all had been slid.'' 
Officer Brady was able to point out to the jury on 
the photographs the location of the skid marks which he 
measured (R. 115-116). Officer Brady further testified 
that he could not describe the details of the density of 
the mark but ''it was a slide mark, a tire mark made by 
sliding." (R. 120) 
On cross-examination he pointed out to the jury 
"marks caused by sliding tires." (R. 122) 
10 
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Officer Clark further testified concerning the skid 
marks. From their place of beginning, 57.1 feet south 
of the curb line at Twenty-First South, they measured 
81.7 feet to the point of impact. (R. 143-144) These 
marks were drawn to scale by the officer on the map 
identified as "Exhibit A". Officer Clark testified that 
the marks which he and Officer Brady measured were 
clear and discernible and that he could see them clearly 
and distinctly. ( R. 152) 
The attention of the Court is invited to the fact that 
the Hardman car was pushed sidewise and northerly by 
the impact a distance of 45.3 feet. The skid marks made 
by the Hardman car were measured, and Officer Clark 
testified that these marks were the same as to color and 
density as the marks left by the truck. (R. 154-155) He 
further testified that what he measured at the scene of 
the accident was skid marks. (R. 163-164) This fol-
lowed all of the cross-examination by defendants' coun-
sel, wherein an attempt was made to get a distinction 
drawn between various kinds of marks made by tires 
on roads. 
It is submitted that the record in this case shows 
clearly and conclusively that the truck skidded into the 
intersection the distances testified to by the witnesses. 
Certainly there is competent evidence from which the 
jury could have concluded that the tires skidded these 
distances. 
The testimony of Dr. Swigart certainly is conclu-
sive if the data upon which it is computed is accurate. 
11 
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This is admitted by defendants' counsel, in his state-
ments during the trial. (R. 179) The doctor was extreme-
ly careful not to speculate; he was generous to the point 
of giving defendants every benefit of doubt. His calcu-
1ations· did not take into consideration the fact that the 
greatest stopping force was applied to the truck before 
it commenced its skid. ( R. 17 5-17 6) Neither did they 
take into consideration the energy consumed by the col-
lision between the car and the truck. A glance at the 
photographs of the car introduced in evidence certainly 
indicates that that energy would have been considerable 
in itself. (R. 189) 
Coupled with this evidence as to skidding is the 
testimony of the truck driver Thurman that he locked 
his wheels (R. 244); that the truck had just been rebuilt 
from the ground up, and, as far as he knew, the brakes 
were applied evenly on all wheels at the same time (R. 
256) ; that at 20 miles per hour the truck could stop 
within 30 feet (R. 257). The testimony of his driving 
companion Huber was to the same effect. (R. 278-279) 
Defendants contend that the truck did not skid but 
that the tire mark was left by the contact of the tire of 
the truck with the road surface in the tire whipping the 
road. In other words, the stopping motion· of the tire 
on the road could. cause a mark, but the tires were not 
skidding. Defendants therefore contend that the for-
mula applied by Dr. Swigart was prejudicial, since it 
depends upon the idea that the tire was sliding. In this 
connection the evidence is clear and the physical fact 
12 
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is 'vithout contradiction that the truck \vas going at n 
much greater speed than \vas indicated by Dr. S\vigart 's 
formula. The stopping- force of the Yehirle \vould he 
greater if the tires \Yl'l'l' not sliding than if they were. The 
formula of Dr. s,vigart, therefore, \vas generous to the 
defendants if defendants' contention is correct. t~ertainly 
they haYe no justifiable complaint to its application. 
Dr. Swigart's discussion of this principal appears 
throughout his testimony. It is especially clear at R. 17 4-
175. He concludes: 
"If there is any mark that would be called a 
skid mark left at all, then I would say you would 
be very safe in using the co-efficient of sliding 
friction because if there is any skid mark being 
left at all, you would have a co-efficient as great 
as co-efficient sliding of friction because the other 
would be a tire mark, because that is rolling and 
once it starts sliding a little bit, so long as the 
tire isn't rotating free rolling speed, with that 
speed you "rould be perfectly justified in using 
co-efficient sliding of friction, it might be greater 
than that because it isn't sliding, this would be' a 
reasonable figure to use." (R. 175-6.) 
What complaint can defendants have to the use of 
expert testimony based upon data weighed in such a 
conservative fashion as this. Certainly under the avail-
able data it is clear that defendants' truck was being 
driven at a rate of at least 42.5 miles per hour. If it was 
going faster than this speed, how can they complain~ 
The jury is entitled to have presented to it the most 
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Appellants argue that the Court erroneously ad-
mitted the testimony of Dr. Swigart, because he did not 
personally conduct any test to ascertain the co-efficiency 
of friction on the surface involved in this accident. It is 
submitted that this contention is facetious on its face. 
Dr. Swigart testified that he had a Ph.D. major in 
physics; that he had conducted experiments on friction 
and sliding objects for twenty years at the University of 
Utah; that he had made studies relative to the co-effi-
ciency of friction, and was familiar particularly with 
the study of tires sliding upon road surfaces. He testi-
fied that if he was given the data he could determine the 
speed of the vehicle by the skid marks left by the vehicle 
upon the surface over which it skidded. He demonstrated 
to the jury the formula used to compute the speed. (R. 
166, 167, 168) He was certainly qualified to testify as 
to what the speed would be, based upon the data fur-
nished by the other witnesses. 
One cannot read the testimony of Dr. Swigart in 
the record without being impressed that his opinion was 
based upon scientific accuracy and carefully studied 
computations, and that he displayed the utmost caution. 
Certainly defendants have no right to complain that this 
evidence was submitted to the jury for consideration. 
14 
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POINT II. 
THE QUESTIONS OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLI-
GENCE, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND 
PROXIMATE CAUSE -\'{ERE PROPERLY SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY. 
Appellants rely primarily on the cases of Cederloff 
v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 Pac. (2d) 777; French v. 
Utah Oil Refining Co., ______ Utah ______ , 216 Pac. (2d) ·1002; 
Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah, 115, 56 Pac. (2d) 1049. 
With reference to the negligence about which de-
fendants complain of plaintiff in this action, these cases 
are not in point. It is respectfully submitted that none 
of these cases applies to the facts in the case at bar. In 
the Cederloff case the driver making the left-hand turn 
in front of the vehicle was proceeding south and a turn 
was made directly in front of a north-bound vehicle. The 
testimony was clear that there was nothing between the 
two vehicles to obstruct the vision of either driver. De-
fendants' negligence in that action was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the accident as a matter of law, because 
the Court concluded that the plaintiff had a right to as-
sume that under the circumstances the plaintiff was con-
tinuing in a south-bound direction or would permit plain-
tiff to pass before proceeding across the highway. De-
fendant could see plaintiff's vehicle all the time, and 
plaintiff could see defendant's vehicle. There was noth-
ing to obstruct the view. 
15 
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Similarly, in French v. Utah Oil Refining Company, 
supra, the Court held that our statute governing the 
turning vehicle at an intersection required the person 
making the turn to exercise reasonable care for his own 
safety. The Court said that when there is a reasonable 
possibility that the movement cannot be made in safety, 
then the turning driver should yield. In that case as in 
the Cederloff case, the turning drivers had unobstructed 
view of traffic approaching from the opposite direction. 
In both cases, if the turning drivers had looked they 
would have seen the approaching vehicle and, in the 
exercise of reasonable judgment, the Court held that 
. they should either have stopped to permit the approach-
ing vehicle to proceed or they were guilty of negligence. 
Fox v. Lavender has no application as far as the negli-
gence problem is concerned. 
Our case does not come within the scope of these 
decisions because the driver of the Hardman automobile 
in the case at bar could not see from her position at the 
intersection the approach of the Dickey truck. Between 
her automobile and the Dickey truck on the inside lane 
for north-bound traffic was a big oil tanker. On the 
next lane to the east was a tan sedan. The headlights 
of these vehicles glared into the face of Mrs. Hardman. 
Directly east from these two lanes, just off the curb, 
was the big Utah Oil service station with glaring, bright 
lights. Traffic was heavy in the intersection. The tanker 
and the tan car stopped, apparently yielding the right-
of-way to Mrs. Hardman. She looked then to the East 
to the pedestrian lane to determine whether anything 
16 
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obstructed the contemplated movement of her automo-
bile. Nothing was there and she proceeded to move the 
car in an easterly direction, "'\Yatching south and east at 
all times. 
Can this Court say as a matter of la"'\Y that under 
these facts and circumstances ~Irs. Hardman is bound, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, to anticipate that a 
thirty-ton truck and load is going to be barrelling into 
that intersection in the outside lane at a speed in excess 
of forty miles per hour J ~Ir. Thurman, the driver of 
the Dickey truck, testified that he could not see an object 
in front of the tanker. Ho,y·, then, can the Court say 
that 1\Irs. Hardman as a matter of law was bound to 
anticipate that there was a reasonable probability that 
a vehicle of the size and weight and speed of the Dickey 
truck was going to enter the intersection in the eastern-
most lane? Certainly the Court cannot hold that it is 
neg-ligence as a matter of law for a driver of a vehicle 
making a left-hand turn in an intersection not to antici-
pate such reckless and wanton disregard for the safety 
of others. 
Some point was made of the fact that the trailer 
on the Dickey truck was thirteen feet high. Of course, 
this is an element to consider in passing upon all of the 
circumstances. It is also true that the Hardman car 
was so far to the south in the intersection that Mrs. 
·Hardman was unable to see the semaphore. The light 
had been green for some time and, like any other ex-
perienced driver, Mrs. Hardman anticipated the change 
in the stopping of north-bound traffic. In fact, almost 
17 
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instantaneously with the collision the light did change 
for northbound traffic from green to yellow, according 
to the testimony of witness Lariente. 
Mrs. Hardman accelerated her car from a stopped 
position to seven miles per hour at a uniform rate. At 
42 miles per hour, the truck would, therefore, have been 
600 feet south of the intersection at the time she com-
menced her turn. (See testimony of Dr. Swigart, R. 192, 
193.) In view of the fact that the truck was to her in-
visible, is this Court to hold as a matter of law that 
she was negligent in not anticipating, in the language of 
the French case, that "there is a reasonable probability 
that the movement cannot be made in safety~" Cer-
tainly the facts of this case are different from those 
which have heretofore been before the Court, and the 
principles governing the standard of care to be exer-
cised by the driver of the Hardman vehicle must not be 
confused with the situation present in previous decisions 
and previous cases. 
Moreover, the Court's attention is invited to the 
fact that Mrs. Hardman was not as a matter of law the 
agent of her husband at the time she was driving this 
vehicle. It is true that her husband was the owner of 
the automobile, and, under these circumstances the case 
of Fox v. Lavender, on which the defendants rely so 
heavily, holds that she was presumably driving at his 
direction. However, Mrs. Hardman's testimony in this 
case rebuts that presumption. The suggestion to drive 
from the Royal Dairy to the ice cream shop was hers. 
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Her husband did not ever give her any directions as to 
the course she should take or as to the precautions she 
should take in making the journey. The presumption of 
agency certainly should not have been converted into a 
conclusion of fact for the jury. 
In any event, in this regard the defendants cannot 
complain because the Court instructed the jury that as 
a matter of law l\lrs. Hardman was Mr. Hardman's 
agent. The jury was further instructed that plaintiff in 
the action was the deceased's agent. Of course, plaintiff 
in the action is a quasi-trustee for the benefit of the 
heirs and widow. Certainly the Court's instructions in 
this regard were in no way prejudicial to the defendants ; 
in fact, defendants received more generous instructions 
than those to which they were enttiled under the law. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS RULINGS. 
(a) The testimony of Witness Brady was properly 
admitted. 
Defendants complain that Witness Brady was per-
mitted to answer the following question: ''Assuming 
that the evidence in this case will show that the foot 
brake operates both the tractor and trailer wheels, then 
an air brake in proper functioning order would apply 
equally on all wheels, would it not~" The answer to 
this question was in no way prejudicial to defendants. 
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Both Th1irman and Fuger testified that Thurman locked 
his wheels ( R. 244) ; that the brakes were applied evenly 
on all whe.els at the same time. (R. 256; 278-279) 
An examination of the exhibits by the witnesses 
disclosed that the skid marks made by the front wheels 
of the truck extended to the place where the Hardman 
car came to rest after being pushed northward across 
the intersection. The same skid marks showed the rear 
wheels of the truck. It is clear that all of the brakes, 
both as to tractor and trailer, were set. The answer by 
Witness Brady was therefore certainly in no way preju-
dicial to defendants. (See the photographs marked ex-
hibits 2 and B and the map marked Exhibit A.) 
(b) The expert opinion of Dr. Swigart was prop-
erly admitted. 
This point has been discussed in detail under 
Point I. Dr. Swigart made a computation based upon 
measured skid marks and an actual test to determine 
the co-efficient of the friction. It was a conservative 
calculation because it did not take into consideration 
any of the factors evidencing spe.ed except the skidding 
of the truck. Certainly there was evidence for the jury 
to consider as to whether the tires skidded. 
(c) The testimony of Wi-tness Peterson as to the 
qualifications of deceased was properly admitted. 
Mr. L. C. Peterson testified that he was Secretary-
Treasurer of Bailey, Inc., and that Mr. Hardman was 
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manager and accountant of this corporation at the time 
of his death. He testified that to his kno,vledge J\L r. 
Hardman's abilities had been discussed at a meeting of 
the board of directors, and he kne'Y there ·w·onld be an 
opportunity for him to advance as the company con-
tinued to develop. There is nothing prejudicial in any 
of the rulings as to admissibility of his testimony. Cer-
tainly the attitude and opinion of an employer is ad-
missible in determining the future earning capacity in 
an action of this character. 
(d) Defendants' motion to dismiss was properly 
denied. 
It is apparent that there was competent and reason-
able evidence from which the jury could determine that 
the defendant Thurman was negligent in driving his 
truck, and that the deceased was not guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. These factors were discussed under 
Point II. The cases relied upon by defendants do not 
apply to the circumstances of this case. The unanimous 
verdict of the- jury amply demonstrates that there was 
sufficient evidence to support plaintiff's judgment. 
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POINT IV. 
DEFENDANTS CANNOT COMPLAIN OF THE IN-
STRUCTIONS OF THE COURT, SINCE THEY 
WERE MORE GENEROUS TO THEM THAN THE 
LAW REQUIRES. 
(a) The Court instructed the jury that the negli-
gence of the plaJintiff was imputable to the deceased as 
a matter of law. 
The Court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff 
was negligent in the operation of the Hardman vehicle, 
and if she ''suddenly and carelessly and negligently 
made a left turn in front of defendants' approaching 
truck without first ascertaining that such movement 
could be made with safety and under such circumstances 
that Gaines Edward Thurman, the driver and operator 
of defendants' truck, could not reasonably have expected 
or anticipated that plaintiff was going to so turn to the 
left, then the speed, if any, of defendants' truck would 
not be a proximate cause of the collision, and if you fur-
ther find that plaintiff carelessly and negligently made 
said left hand turn as hereinabove stated, then your 
verdict must be in favor of defendants and against the 
plaintiff, No Cause of Action.'' (Instruction No. 11; R. 
66) Instructions concerning contributory negligence are 
also contained in Instruction No. 13 (R. 68) and Instruc-
tion No. 7 (R. 62). The Court thereby instructed the 
jury that as a matter of law any negligence of Mrs. 
Hardman was imputable to her deceased husband. 
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Defendants rely upon the case of Fox ·o. La·ve~uder, 
89 Utah, 115, 56 Pac. (2d) 1049. Defendants' Instruc-
tion No. 4 is to the same effeet as the instructions of the 
Court given, viz: that the negligence of Mrs. Hardman, 
if any, "\Yas imputed to her husband. The Fox v. Laven-
der case does not so hold and the law is to the contrary. 
Fox r. Lavender only holds that if the automobile is 
owned by the husband and he is a passenger at the time 
of the accident, and the 'vife is driving the automobile, 
then a presumption arises to the effect that the wife is 
driving as an agen~ of the husband. The presumption 
merely permits the jury to find that the wife was driving 
as her husband's _agent and under his control. It does 
not require the jury to so find. It simply permits such 
an inference. 
Moreover, in the case at bar the presumption was 
clearly rebutted by evidence which established that at 
no time did Mr. Hardman give any instructions as to 
the driving of the car, either with reference to the 
course which should be followed or as to its operation 
while en route. The instructions given by the Court 
were therefore more generous than they were· entitled 
to receive. They presented defendants' theory unmis-
takably to the jury. The giving of Instructions Nos. 4 
and 5 simply would have been unduly repetitious and 
would add nothing in substance to those already given. 
(b) The matters covered by Instruction No·. 12 were 
adequately presented by Instruction No. 15. 
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In defendants' Instruction No. 15 the Court stated 
that any damages should be computed by way of allow-
ance for pecuniary recompense, and that they should 
include the amount of support to the wjfe and minor 
children, the money value of the loss suffered by the 
wife and minor children by reason of loss of comfort 
and society, and that general damages could not ~exceed 
$75,000.00. There was no issue in the case as to any 
element by reason of the pain and suffering of deceased; 
there was no such argument to the jury at any time. 
Considered as a whole, the instructions adequately 
covered the proper elements of damage. No prejudicial 
error was committed by the Court's failure to give de-
fendants' Instruction No. 12 in defendants' language. 
(c) The question of contributory negligence was 
adequately covered. 
Most of defendants' requested instructions reiter-
ated the idea of contributory negligence. In their brief 
defendants complained that each and every one of the 
r~quested instructions were not given. As has been 
pointed out to the Court, the Trial Judge gave at least 
three instructions concerning what conduct on the part 
of plaintiff would amount to contributory negligence in 
this case, and that such conduct would bar plaintiff's 
recovery. Defendants' requested instructions were un-
. duly repetitious and argumentative. As has been shown, 
the instructions were more generous than defendants 
had a right to have given. As has been shown, the in-
structions gave to . defendants every benefit of doubt. 
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The jury found that there "·as no contributory negli-
gence. It is submitted that the instructions adequately 
presented defendants' theory of the case, and failure to 
giYe Instructions Nos. 7 and 11 "·as in no '"ay prejudicial. 
It is respectfully submitted that the jury was en-
titled to consider the questions of negligenee, contribu-
tory negligence, proximate cause and damage in the case 
at bar. The application of the doctrine of the Cederloff 
and French cases certainly should not be extended to the 
circumstances now before the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN 
AND RICHARDS, 
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